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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
MAURICE T. DAVIS,
                  Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 05-cr-00454-3)
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 4, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 31, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Maurice Davis appeals his sentence of 240 months imprisonment on the basis that
the sentence that the District Court imposed on him was unreasonable.  Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Davis pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to interfere with interstate
2commerce by robbery and two counts of interference with interstate commerce by
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and one count of using and carrying a
firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
In December 2004, Davis and two co-defendants developed a plan to rob a Sally
Beauty Supply store in Philadelphia.  On December 23, 2004, the men drove to the store
and Davis’ two co-defendants robbed it at gunpoint while Davis remained in the car.  The
three men then proceeded to rob a Sunoco store.  While one of his co-defendants pointed
a loaded gun at the clerk, Davis emptied the cash register.  A high speed police chase
ultimately ensued during which Davis sat in the back seat and acted as navigator.  The
robbers eventually struck another vehicle and crashed into a median.  The police
apprehended the three men and recovered the gun and some of the stolen money.
A federal grand jury indicted the three men for conspiracy and robbery, subjecting
them to a maximum possible sentence of 20 years.  Davis and his co-defendants were also
charged with two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, a
violation carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, as well as a mandatory
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Davis waived, with limited exceptions, his right to1
a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence to this Court.  Under his agreement with the
Government, Davis may only file a direct appeal if it raises one or more of the following
claims:  (1) his sentence on any count of conviction exceeds the statutory maximum
sentence; (2) the court erroneously departed upward pursuant to the Sentencing
Guidelines; or (3) the sentencing judge, in exercising the court's discretion pursuant to
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), imposed an unreasonable sentence above
the final Sentencing Guidelines range determined by the court.  As the District Court
(1) imposed a sentence below the statutory maximum, (2) did not depart upward, and
(3) imposed a sentence below the calculated Guidelines range, none of these exceptions
apply here.
3
minimum sentence of seven years, consecutive to any other sentence imposed.  18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A).  Moreover, if convicted on both counts of violating § 924(c)(1)(A), each
defendant could receive an additional twenty-five years mandatory consecutive
incarceration.
All three defendants agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy count, the two
robbery counts and one count for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  In exchange for
these guilty pleas, the government agreed to dismiss the other § 924(c)(1)(A) count. 
Davis’ plea agreement also included sentencing stipulations which, pursuant to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, included the following: that a firearm was
brandished during each of the offenses; that Davis recklessly created a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer; and, that due to his prior felony convictions, Davis was a career
offender.  In addition, Davis’ plea agreement contained an appellate waiver.1
4Prior to accepting Davis’ guilty plea, the District Court reviewed the plea
agreement with him in order to ensure that he was entering the plea knowingly and
intelligently.  Davis admitted that he aided in the preparation for the robbery,
accompanied his co-defendants to the Sally Beauty Supply store, and was aware that the
robbery was going to take place there and that a gun would be brandished during the
robbery.  In addition, Davis admitted that he helped prepare for, and participated in, the
Sunoco store robbery, where a gun was also brandished.  On December 20, 2005,
following its colloquy, the District Court accepted Davis’ plea, finding it to be knowing,
voluntary, and supported by a factual basis.
The Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the Probation Office included
the sentencing enhancements set forth in Davis’ Guilty Plea Agreement, and calculated a
sentencing range of 262 to 327 months based on the advisory United States Sentencing
Guidelines.  The District Court agreed with this range and found that it was properly
calculated.  However, because the District Court found that the Guidelines calculation
somewhat overstated the criminal history of the defendant, the District Court imposed a
below Guidelines range sentence of 240 months.
II.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
Furthermore, we have jurisdiction over appeals, even where, as here, the defendant has
waived his right to appeal.  United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). 
5However, “we will not exercise that jurisdiction to review the merits of [such an appeal]
if we conclude that [the defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waived h[is] right to appeal
unless the result would work a miscarriage of justice.”  Id.  Because Davis entered a
guilty plea that enumerated the specific issues that he may appeal, the issues he may raise
are limited to those contained in the guilty plea.
III.
Davis’ appeal challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.  However, because
his plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, we can only review the merits of his
claim if his plea was not knowing and voluntary, or if enforcing the waiver would work a
miscarriage of justice.  See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001). 
For the plea agreement to be knowing and voluntary, it must meet both the statutory
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) and the constitutional
requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).  Accordingly, before accepting
a guilty plea, the Court must address the defendant personally in open court and ensure
that the defendant understands the terms of any provision in a plea agreement waiving the
right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.  See Rule 11(c)(6).  A review of the
plea agreement proceedings establishes that through an extensive colloquy, the District
Court properly questioned and advised Davis of his rights, took affirmative steps “to
ensure that the plea was intelligent and voluntary,” and ascertained the factual basis for
6the plea pursuant to Boykin and Rule 11.  See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.  Thus, Davis’ plea,
including his appellate waiver, was knowing and voluntary.
We may also consider the merits of Davis’ appeal if enforcing his waiver would
work a miscarriage of justice.  See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.  We have adopted factors to
consider in determining whether a miscarriage of justice occurred during the District
Court proceedings, including “[t]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g.,
whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the
impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the
government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.”  Id.
Here, Davis claims that it would work a miscarriage of justice to enforce the
waiver because his sentence was unreasonable.  In making this charge, he specifically
challenges the sentencing enhancements for (1) brandishing a firearm and (2) reckless
behavior in the course of fleeing from law enforcement officers.  However, Davis not
only stipulated to these factors in his plea agreement, but also raised no objection to them
when questioned by the District Court regarding the factual basis for these stipulations. 
In addition, because Davis was sentenced as a career offender, convicted for violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and received a three-level credit for acceptance of responsibility, he
automatically qualified for a Guidelines range of 262-327 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(3),
meaning that the two enhancements about which he complains actually had no impact on
the final calculated Guidelines range.  Regardless, there is no indication that the District
7Court’s sentence is unreasonable.  A sentence is considered reasonable if “the record as a
whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District
Court properly discussed and weighed those factors during sentencing, even discounting
one the stipulations regarding his criminal history.  Based on the above, and the fact that
nothing unusual or extraordinary occurred below, enforcement of the appellate waiver
would not work a miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly, we decline to exercise jurisdiction
to review the merits of the appeal.  Gwinnett, 483 F.3d at 203.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
